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Prime Minister of Malaysia has launched the Economic Transformation Programme 
(ETP) on 25 October 2010 with aims to transform Malaysia into a high-income nation by 
2020.One of the focus of ETP is to boost the National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs). 
There are twelve NKEAs specified for ETP, and one of them is Financial Services. It is 
claimed that generally low level of financial literacy among Malaysian public is a 
challenge for the Financial Services sector. As financial information is not only useful for 
business community, several regulatory bodies have taken initiatives to enhance the 
financial literacy not only for investors, but also for the public. 
 
In responding to financial illiterate challenge, this research is conducted to investigate 
initiative taken by companies to enhance the understandability of investors/ potential 
investors about firm financial performance. Specifically, this study is looking at the 
communication of financial ratios in the companies’ annual reports for 2011 by top 100 
listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. A set of financial ratios is chosen because of the 
popularity of this technique as financial analysis tool, its simplicity, yet voluntary nature 
of disclosure in the official annual reports. 
 
Using agency theory as the theoretical background, it is hypothesised that larger 
company with more independent directors on the board and less concentrated ownership 
will communicate more financial ratios to the readers of the annual report. Descriptive 
result reveals on average, 18.4% of the selected ratios were disclosed in the annual 
reports. The most popular ratios are net assets per share, return on equity, return on 
assets and gearing. Regression analysis shows that only independence board influence 
the extent of financial ratio disclosure. 
 
Further research may include more number of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and 
integrate longer period of study. Government-linked and family companies; as well as 
small medium enterprises (SME) also could provide further insight. Using survey and 
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Prime Minister of Malaysia has launched the Economic Transformation Programme 
(ETP) on 25 October 2010 with aims to transform Malaysia into a high-income 
nation by 2020. The high-income is defines as a per capita income of USD15,000 or 
RM48,000, based on the World Bank’s definition of high income. In addition, this 
programme is also targeting Malaysia to become an advanced, developed nation with 
an economy possessing the characteristics that are common to developed nations. 
Together with this aim, ETP also aims to achieve the high income target inclusively 
for all Malaysian to share the benefits, and it must be sustainable in both economics 
and environmental terms (ETP, 2010). 
 
To achieve developed nation status by 2020, economic growth of 6 percent a year 
will be required. Ensuring Malaysia to enjoy this level of growth, a comprehensive 
and structured economic transformation is needed. Among the reasons why Malaysia 
need new approach is a slowing down of GDP growth about 4.3 percent (2001-2009) 
as compared to 9.2 percent (1991-1997). Further, there is also a risk for Malaysia to 
be stuck in the middle-income trap if no systematic programme to transform the 
underlying economies taken place. Strategies used to transform Malaysia from poor 
country to middle income country are no longer appropriate to bring Malaysia as 
higher-income nation. In addition, the global economy is more competitive for 
markets, capital and talent. Malaysia needs to work harder to achieve and sustain the 
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competitive advantage, in order to overcome low level of foreign-direct investment 
into Malaysia (ETP, 2010) 
 
Thus, ETP is introduced to transform Malaysian economy and it is a part of 
comprehensive government agenda. There are several key common foundations for 
the ETP including 1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now; Government 
Transformation Programme; and Tenth Malaysia Plan. The ETP focuses on key 
growth engines or National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs). It also is a private 
sector-led and government facilitated initiatives with 131 entry point projects to jump 
start the programme, focusing on value for money projects and initiatives, with the 
establishment of PEMANDU and guided by foundational measures (SRIs) (ETP, 
2010). 
 
NKEA is defined as a driver of economic activity that has the potential to directly 
and materially contribute a quantifiable amount of economic growth to the Malaysia 
economy. There are 12 NKEAs that are the Oil, Gas and Energy; Palm Oil; Financial 
Services; Tourism; Business Services; Electronics and Electrical; Wholesale and 
Retail’ Education; Healthcare; Communications Contents and Infrastructure; 
Agriculture; and Greater Kuala Lumpur/ Klang Valley. Of the 12 NKEAs, 11 are 
industry sectors and one which is Greater Kuala Lumpur/ Klang Valley is a 
geographical sector. The 11 sectors are expected to deliver 74 percent of the Gross 
National Income (GNI) growth potential over the next decade. Overall, these NKEA 
sectors are sectors in which Malaysia has current or potential competitive advantage, 
representing a mix of service, manufacturing, agriculture and extractive industries. 
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These sectors are spread across urban and rural areas and are likely to support growth 
in the rest of economy (ETP, 2010).  
 
Malaysia will focus its economic growth efforts on NKEAs, which will receive 
prioritized Government support including funding, top talent and Prime Ministerial 
attention. In addition, policy reforms will be targeted at the NKEAs. As shown by 
other countries such as Taiwan, Republic of Korea and Singapore, the specialization 
on certain sectors may transform Malaysia from middle income to high-income 
country. 
 
One of the critical NKEAs is the financial services. There are several challenges 
ahead in this sector as stated in Chapter 7 of the ETP including the low levels of 
financial literacy. It is suggested that the level of personal financial literacy today is 
low overall. With growing consumerism as well as changing customer expectations, 
there is a need to reinforce greater financial literacy to help the Rakyat to better 
manage their personal finances in line with our move to a high-income economy. 
Proper consumer education is needed if growth engines, such as private pensions, 
wealth management and asset management, with their more complex and 
sophisticated products, are to take off (ETP, 2010). 
 
The level of financial literacy can varies from various perspectives. For example, it 
can be different from sophisticated and non-sophisticated users of financial 
information, public people such as school children, teenagers, universities and 
colleges’ students and adults. The financial information is not only useful for users 
that directly utilize such information such as investors, but also for a large group of 
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public people. Nowadays, financial products become more sophisticated and 
complex, thus consumers in general need sufficient level of financial literacy to help 
them in making informed and conscious financial choices. 
 
Many developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Singapore have 
already implemented national strategies on financial literacy. As for Malaysia, 
various organizations such as Bank Negara, Securities Commission (SC), the 
Securities Industry Development Corporation (SIDC), and Bursa Malaysia have 
launched various initiatives to educate their customers to become more financial 
literate. For example, SIDC has various financial literacy programmes as early as kid 
at schools, teenagers, students at university campuses, and Malaysian investors as a 
whole. However, these efforts need to be more focused and better coordinated to 
increase their effectiveness and reach. This is because Malaysian may not yet 
sufficiently financially savvy as we have the highest level of household debt to GDP 
in Asia (about 77%), lack of sufficient knowledge and skills to prepare for retirement 
and making uninformed investment decision (ETP, 2010). 
 
MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
In responding to financial illiterate problem facing by financial information users, 
this research is undertaken to examine the initiatives provided by the Malaysian 
companies in assisting financial users to understand companies’ financial position. 
Undeniable, there are wide range and level of financial literacy perspectives. For 
example, from SIDC perspective, financial literacy can start from a simple view of 
money management for kids from primary school, including saving money, smart 
spending habits and how to plan finances at an early age. It also can be knowledge of 
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budgeting and savings, the different between needs and wants and also basic 
knowledge on investment for secondary school students. At the university level, 
financial literacy can be a knowledge related to financial planning and investing. The 
focus is on how university students should manage their money once they earn the 
money in the future.  
 
Further, another category group of people that could be relevant to the financial 
literacy is investors. To educate Malaysian investors, SIDC is established so they are 
protected from fraudulent transactions and able to make choices as informed market 
participants. SIDC educates and alerts the investors on various issues, such as 
investors’ protections, rights and responsibilities. One of the issues raised by SIDC is 
obligation of companies to disclose information in the annual reports. It is advised 
that investors should understand what is important in the annual report. As there are 
various information provided in the annual reports, investors should be sufficiently 
financially literate to pick up important information to enable them to make informed 
decision making.  
 
By law, directors and accountants of the firm should disclosed information that 
affects the decision making of the investing public. The directors must give a true 
and fair view of the company’s affair and they must not omit or misstate important 
information. It takes experience, knowledge and skills for investors to digest and 
choose relevant information for them.  
 
In addition to the information provided in the annual reports, investors also can get 
information from research analysts of stock broking companies and fund 
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management companies. However, extra careful should be exercised when digesting 
information from these parties because they have their own way to analyze and recast 
accounting information before produce their own report, as compared to what is 
provided by the companies in the official annual reports. Sometimes, information 
provided by these two sources is conflicting and confusing. 
 
SIDC also reminds investors that it is not easy to read annual reports. Judgments 
should be made based on facts, and not on publicity or propaganda. The important 
details in the annual reports are sometimes hidden between the lines, and investors 
are suggested to know how to read between the lines to get accurate information. 
 
This is where the communication of financial ratios in the annual report comes into 
the picture. Financial ratios are among financial statement analysis tool that are 
widely used in communicating financial performance of the firms. For the purpose of 
this study, a financial ratio is defined as a mathematical relation between two 
quantities (Subramanyam and Wild, 2009). The communication of financial ratios is 
measured as pre-defined ratios provided or reported by companies in their annual 
reports. Thus, this study is focusing on initiatives made by companies in 
communicating voluntary, yet important information in their annual reports, in order 
to assists their investor in understanding the financial conditions of the firms. 
 
Financial ratio disclosures are critically important for several reasons.  First, the 
disclosures could serve as the crucial information for users of financial statements, 
including sophisticated or non sophisticated users. Sophisticated users are reliant on 
disclosed financial ratios to assess the performance of companies.  Therefore, 
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providing a comprehensive set of financial ratios and how each was defined are 
crucial sources of information.  For non-sophisticated users, the financial ratio 
disclosures will enable them to make an informed investment decision making.  In 
addition, many ratios computed today are not standard. The lacks of uniformity 
limits the comparability in financial statements analysis and encourage companies to 
disclose the most favourable ratios to their firm’s condition (Gibson and Boyer, 
1980). Gibson (1982, p18) viewed that “probably no tool is more effective in 
evaluating the financial future of a company than the proper use of financial ratios”. 
Thus, the financial ratio disclosures are essential to overcome these problems.  
 
Despite their wide use and stated importance, there typically is a paucity of financial 
ratio information disclosed in company’s annual reports.  In recent years, there has 
been increasing interest in financial ratio disclosures.  Gibson (1982) provides a list 
and description of ratios that are frequently used in annual reports.  Watson, Shrives 
and Marston (2002) investigate the relationship between financial ratio disclosures 
and firm characteristics in U.K, while Australian companies were studied by Mitchell 
(2006) on their selectivity of reporting.  In Malaysia, Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2008) 
investigated the association between accounting ratios and performance of the firms. 
They found low level of disclosure. Ho, Aripin and Tower (2012) analyzed the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on financial 
ratios disclosure over the turbulent 2001 and 2006 periods in Malaysia. They found 
the highest category of financial ratio disclosures are profitability. None of corporate 
governance mechanisms are significantly influenced such disclosure. To date there 
has been little agreement on what should be disclosed due to the voluntary nature of 
financial ratio disclosures (with the notable exception of EPS).  This highlights the 
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requirement to understand how and why financial ratio information disclosures are 
made by firm management and the board of directors. 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study embarks on the following objectives: 
1. To examine the extent of financial ratio information communicated in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies. 
2. To examine the significant predictors influencing the extent of financial ratio 
communicated in the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are examined: 
1. What is the extent of disclosures of financial ratio information in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies? 
2. What are the significant predictors influencing the extent of financial ratio 
disclosures in the annual reports of Malaysia listed companies? 
 
SUMMARY 
This report is organised as follows. Chapter One provides an overview of the 
research including its background, motivation of the study, research questions and 
objectives.  Chapter Two reviews the previous literature and hypotheses to be tested 
are developed in this chapter using agency theory.  The research methodology is 
discussed in Chapter Three. It explains how every variable is measured and collected 
as well as what statistical techniques are utilized. Finally, Chapter Four presents the 
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findings and discussions. Chapter Five highlights the conclusion of the study; discuss 







This chapter provides insights on the literature of management disclosure incentive using 
the agency theory. Further, the discussion on the advantages of disclosure within the 
annual report is offered. Then, hypotheses development is discussed. 
 
AGENCY THEORY 
This research employs agency theory to assist in determining suitable factors that could 
influence voluntary financial ratio disclosures patterns. Agency theory is concerned with 
the relationship between the principal (owner) and agent (manager) of the firm. The 
underlying basis of agency theory is that one party (the principal) assigns work to another 
(the agent) who performs that work. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308), 
agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal/s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”.  
 
They also explain that agency theory enhances understanding of the situation where 
separate ownership and control between owner and top management of the firm occurs. 
They also suggest that these parties have their own concerns and preferences giving rise to 
what is known as a ‘conflict of interest’. A conflict of interest arises from divergent goals 





According to Fama and Jensen (1983), a considerably high cost is needed to monitor the 
actions and decisions made by an agent. This is because full monitoring of an agent’s 
actions seems unlikely in any principal-agent contract especially for large firms in 
developed industrial societies (Scott, 1997). The agency costs may include a component of 
expenditures incurred by the principal to monitor the agent, the agent’s cost on bonding, 
and the residual loss. In addition, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest the resolution to 
agency problems may require formal contracts, monitoring of management by the board of 
directors, information intermediaries and the market for corporate control.  
 
ADVANTAGES OF DICLOSURE WITHIN THE ANNUAL REPORT 
This section provides insights into the benefits of increased disclosure quantity. It is based 
on the argument that firms should provide sufficient decision-useful information to their 
stakeholders. Knauss (1964, p.607) posits that “disclosure, however, is not a simple 
method of regulation having universal application and universal effectiveness. It assumes a 
different role and meaning depending on the information to be disclosed, and the parties 
for whom the information is intended”.  
 
Botosan (2006) suggests public disclosure mitigates information asymmetry by displacing 
private information and concludes that greater disclosure reduces cost of equity capital.  
Further, Lundholm and Winkle (2006) develop and utilise the same theoretical framework 
in summarising the existing empirical work in the voluntary disclosure area. 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that disclosure reduces information asymmetry and 
cost of capital. Thus, more disclosure benefits both the firm and its stakeholders. In a 
related study, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) study the relationship between share 
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performance and extent of voluntary disclosure. They report that increased disclosure is 
associated with increases in stock performance, growth in institutional ownership, 
increased stock liquidity and higher analyst coverage.  
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that by disclosing more future information, it reduces 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, improves accuracy of users expectation and it also 
could attract the attention of analysts.  In addition, provision of forward looking 
information reduces the cost of capital. Thus, it implies that more disclosure of future-
orientated information reduces uncertainty of users.  
 
Evans and Sridhar (2002) investigate how disclosure may influence capital markets, 
product markets and shareholder litigation. They argue that favourable disclosure lead to a 
lower cost of capital. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) list five factors that motivate 
firms to voluntary disclose information. These are information asymmetry, increased 
analyst coverage, corporate control test, stock compensation and management talent. On 
the other hand, they suggest constraints on voluntary disclosure which are litigation risk, 
proprietary costs, political costs and agency cost, and limitation of mandatory disclosure 
precedent that may be hard to maintain.  
 
To conclude, previous studies have reported ample evidence on the positive impact of 
disclosure to the firms and shareholders. Several studies have applied agency theory in 
explaining the choice of disclosure policy by the firms. It is suggested that voluntary 
disclosure, in addition to mandatory disclosure, reduces the information asymmetry 
problem and therefore enhances better informed decision making. This notion applies to 
voluntary financial ratio disclosures. Despite its obvious benefits and functions, the 
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amount of research on voluntary disclosure of financial ratios is still low. Therefore, this 
study explores factors that encourage firms to voluntarily disclosed financial ratios in their 
annual reports. 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section provides the theoretical background utilized as a backbone for this research. 
Then, the hypotheses are developed based on past literature. A considerable amount of 
literature has been published on this voluntary financial reporting (Barako, 2004; Eng, 
Hong and Ho, 2001; Botosan, 1997; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; Hossain, Tan and 
Adams, 1994; Cooke, 1989; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 
1982). Meek et al. (1995, p. 555) defines voluntary disclosure as “disclosure in excess of 
requirements – represent free choices on the part of company managements to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their 
annual reports”. This section reviews previous studies that examine the association 




Corporate governance factors have the potential to minimize agency problems between 
managers and shareholders.  There are internal and external governance mechanisms 
designed to reduce agency costs.  These mechanisms are essential to moderate the self-
serving activities of managers.  Adoption of governance attributes as recommended by the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance  (MCCG)  constitute as one of the mechanism 
that helps reduce agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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In this study, the strength of corporate governance is measured as the proportion of 
independent directors on the board.  As proposed by Bathala and Rao (1995), composition 
of the board is one of several mechanisms than can mitigate agency conflicts within the 
firm, as outlined by agency literature.  The argument of agency theory is that independent 
directors are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions of executive directors 
due to their opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and also to ensure that 
managers are working in the best interest of the principal (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990).    
 
Palmieri (1979) states that independent directors are critically important because their 
extensive knowledge, experience and they are independent from management, and 
therefore serve an important role to minimise agency problems.  As highlighted by John 
and Senbet (1998), board composition is an important element to determine the 
effectiveness of the board.  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that an independent board 
serves as an important check and balance mechanism in enhancing boards’ effectiveness. 
Support for these assertions is further provided by Fama and Jensen (1983),  Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1995) and Eng and Mak (2003) . 
 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that boards with a larger proportion of independent 
directors are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure in Singapore.  This study also indicates that firms with boards that have a 
majority of independent directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms 
with boards that do not have a majority of independent directors.  In addition, Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) examined the association between independent directors and corporate 
disclosure.  They found a positive relationship between a board with a higher proportion of 
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independent directors and comprehensive financial disclosure.  These findings are 
consistent with agency theory where higher proportion of independent directors enhances 
voluntary financial reporting (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006). 
 
Further, the effect of good governance practices on the quality of financial reporting has 
recently received attention from researchers (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides, 
2000; Beasley 1996).  Beasley (1996) found that no-fraud firms have boards that have a 
significantly higher percentage of outside members than fraud firms.   These studies 
demonstrate that the inclusion of outside members on the board reduces the occurrence of 
financial statement fraud, and therefore assists in the provision of reported information that 
faithfully represents the value of financial statement elements. Goodwin and Seow (2002) 
argue that sound governance by board of directors influence the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
Computed financial ratios are an effective tool to evaluate firms’ operational results 
(Mitchell, 2006) and deemed to be the mirror of firms’ performance where higher financial 
ratios generally identify profitable firms (Horrigan, 1965).  Misuse of entities’ financial 
resources could be highlighted by financial ratios.  Thus, the transparency of corporate 
governance elements could minimize poor performance or mitigates fraudulent activity.  
This ultimately will influence the financial ratio disclosure policy, where firms with 
effective governance structure are expected to disclose more financial ratios as publicly 
available information. 
 
Consistent with this rationale, it is expected that the extent of financial ratio information 
disclosed will be positively related to the strength of corporate governance attributes of the 
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firm.  The reason for this is that the presence of independent directors makes the release of 
voluntary information less costly because insiders have less to hide (Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007). This leads to a hypothesis that underlines the link between a firm’s governance 
structure and their disclosure of financial ratio information.  The requirement to disclose 
corporate governance attributes will facilitate a comparison between a firm’s corporate 
governance characteristics and financial ratio disclosures.  To formally test the influence of 
corporate governance on financial ratio disclosures, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 




Ownership structure is another mechanism that aligns the interest of shareholders and 
managers (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Hossain 
et al., 1994).  It is believed that agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) will be 
higher in the widely held companies because of the diverse interests between contracting 
parties (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). By utilizing voluntary disclosure, managers 
provide more information to signal that they work in the best interests of shareholders.   
 
Using agency theory tenets, it is argued that firms with higher concentration of ownership 
structure may disclose less information to shareholders through discretionary disclosure.  
In Australia, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) note highly diversified companies disclose 
more voluntary information.  In this case, a sample of 65 listed diversified companies was 
studied on their voluntary disclosure of segment information.  Hossain et al. (1994) 
reported a negative association between ownership structure concentration (measured by 
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top 10 shareholders) and the level of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed firms.  
Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) hypothesised that the companies with higher 
ownership concentration disclose less voluntary information.  They found that director 
ownership is significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Lakhal 
(2005) found that share ownership concentration is statistically and negatively associated 
to voluntary earnings disclosures.  Oliveira et al. (2006) also documented that firms with a 
lower shareholder concentration voluntarily disclose more information about intangibles in 
Portugal. 
 
However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosures.  Craswell and Taylor (1992) found no 
relationship between ownership structure and the voluntary disclosure of reserves.  In 
research of voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies, Barako (2004) also 
found no relationship. 
 
Previous literatures clearly evident that information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders can be mitigated by disclosure strategies (Healy and Palepu, 2001). For this 
particular research, it is expected that ownership structure may influence the voluntary 
disclosure of financial ratio.  Therefore, the next hypotheses to be tested are: 




Firm size is another factor that may potentially influence financial ratio disclosure 
practices.  A large and growing body of literature has investigated the impact of firm size 
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to the disclosure practices of firms (Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Buzby, 1975; Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  Most of these studies found 
that size does affect the level of financial reporting of companies. 
Further, Watson et al. (2002) investigate the voluntary disclosure of accounting ratios in 
UK.  Their result suggests that large companies are more likely to disclose ratios than 
small companies.  Barako et al. (2006) study the factors influencing voluntary corporate 
disclosure by Kenyan companies and found that size is one of the factors that encourage 
the firm to disclose more information.  In another voluntary environmental disclosure 
study by large UK companies, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) also note that the larger the 
firm, the more likely they will make voluntary disclosures of environmental issues.   
 
In addition, Singhvi and Desai (1971) outline several reasons for a positive relationship 
between size of company and quality of disclosure.  They argued that larger firms tend to 
provide a better quality of disclosure because the lower cost of accumulating detailed 
information.  The other reasons are managers of larger company are more likely to realise 
the possible benefits of better disclosure and small companies are more likely to feel that 
full disclosure of information could endanger their competitive position.  
 
It can be concluded that firm size does matter to the voluntary financial reporting practices 
of companies.  Thus, the impact of firm size is also expected to be in the same direction for 
financial ratio disclosures.  Hypotheses designed to test this assertion are formally stated 
as: 








SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCE 
The companies are selected from top 100 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for 2011. 
These high profile companies are selected because the aim of study is looking at the 
initiatives provided by companies in communicating financial information.  It is believed 
that these high profile companies are pro-active in assisting government to realise the 
national agenda, ETP.  The year 2011 is considered as a one-year period after 
government’s announcement of ETP. The annual reports were gathered and the data were 
hand collected. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND MEASUREMENT 
The dependent variable of the study is Extent Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD)  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) 
The Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) Index is the proxy to measure the 
extensiveness of financial ratios disclosure.  This variable captures the voluntary 
disclosure practice of financial ratios in the annual reports. A disclosure index comprising 
list of ratios commonly discussed by seminal authors is developed. Based on Ho, Aripin 
and Tower (2012), the list is narrowed down to 10 mostly referred and cited financial 





Table 1: List of ratio and definition 
 Financial ratio Definition 
1. Net  Assets per Share (NAPS) Measure firm’s value per share. 
2. Return on equity (ROE) Measure profit a company generates with the 
money shareholders have invested. 
3. Return on assets (ROA) Measure profit of a company relative to its total 
assets 
4. Gearing (GEA) Measure the extent to which company’s operations 
are funded by lenders versus shareholders 
5. Dividend payout (DP) Measure how well earnings support the dividend 
payments 
6. Dividend yield (DY) Measure how much a company pays out in 
dividends each year relative to its share price 
7. Return on shareholder (RS) Measure a  return of a stock to an investor 
8. Price to earnings ratio (PE)  
 
Measure company's current share price compared 
to its per-share earnings. 
9. Gross profit margin (GPM Measure the proportion of money left over from 
revenues after accounting for the cost of goods 
sold. 
10. Debt to equity (DE) 
 
Measure the proportion of equity and debt the 
company is using to finance its assets. 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) is excluded since it is the sole financial ratio required to be 
disclosed by the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB).  Each voluntary ratio 
will be noted as being disclosed (1) if presented in the annual report for each company and 
(0) otherwise.  The EFRD score will then be computed by summing up all items disclosed 
divided by 10.  The EFRD score can be mathematically represented as follows: 
 
EFRDj =  total number of financial ratios disclosed 
                                 10 
Where:  






INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MEASURE 
To examine the extent of financial ratio disclosures in the annual report, the following 
independent variables will be tested: corporate governance, ownership concentration and 
firm size. 
 
Board independence (BODIND) 
Board independence is defined as the proportion of independent directors on the board.  
The Code on Corporate Governance Malaysia states a company should have a majority of 
independent directors on their board.  Therefore, BODIND is a measure of the percentage 
of independent directors to total number of directors on the board of directors.  The 
BODIND, measured as a percentage, and treated as a continuous variable.  
 
Ownership Score (OS) 
To create a proxy measure for Ownership Score (OS), total shareholding of top 30 
shareholders are used. OS is treated as a continuous variable by dividing number of shares 
owned by top thirty shareholders by the total number of shares issued.  
 
Firm Size (FSIZE) 
Firm size measurement is extensively studied in the past research.  It has been 
demonstrated that firm size is positively associated with disclosure levels (Barako, 2004; 
Watson et al., 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Singhvi 
and Desai, 1971).  There are variations on how firm size is determined.  For example 
Barako (2004) and Watson et al. (2002)  used total assets to measure firm size.  In 
contrast,  Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) used market value of equity and the book value 
of debt. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) used log of total assets and log of number of 
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shareholders to measure firm size.  For this research, firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  As suggested by Hossain et al. (1994), natural logarithmic 
transformation is used to reduce skewness in the data set. 
 
Control Variables Measure 
In order to control for other effects on the dependent variables, two (2) control variables 
are suggested.  These are (1) Profit/ Loss Firm (PLF) and (2) type of auditor.  PLF is 
measured as a categorical, where a score of (1) is assigned to profit firm, and (0) to loss 
firm. Similarly, a score of (1) is assign for Big4 audit firm; and otherwise (0). These 
variables are selected because it shed some lights on this issue in the previous studies. 
 
Data Analysis 
The data was run using SPSS software. Descriptive, univariate and regressions analysis 















RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. On 
average, the sample firms disclose 18.4% of the selected financial ratios in their annual 
reports. This Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) percentage is considered 
moderate as compare to previous studies by Ho, Aripin and Tower (2012). One possible 
reason is because the number of selected financial ratios in this study was reduced to 10, as 
compared to 43 financial ratios in the previous research. There were companies which not 
provided the selected financial ratios at all. However, the maximum percentage of the 
disclosure is 60% of the selected financial ratios. 
 
For the board independence (BODIND), almost half of the members of the board of 
directors are independent. This is in line with Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
recommendation where majority of the directors sit on the boardroom should be 
independence. The maximum proportion of independent directors on the board is 75%, 
which is beyond the recommendation by MCCG. 
 
Further, the ownership score (OS) is measured as the percentage of shareholding of top 30 
shareholders. As reported in Table 2, the minimum percentage of top 30 shareholders is 
26%, while the maximum percentage is 96%, with average percentage of shareholding of 




 Firm size (FSIZE) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets of the sample firms. 
The transformation is done to ensure the distribution of the data is normal. On average, the 
FSIZE is 9.51, with minimum and maximum score of 7.3 and 11.47 respectively. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 




100 23% 75% 45.37% 11.97% 
Ownership 
Score (OS) (%) 
100 26% 96% 80.63% 11.16% 
Firm Size 
(FSIZE)  
100 7.30 11.47 9.51 0.67 
Profit loss Firm 
(PLF) 
100 0 1 95% 21.9% 
Big4 (BIG4) 100 0 1 94% 23.9% 
 
 
Profit or loss firm (PLF) and type of auditor (BIG4) are measured using categorical 
dummy measure. From the analysis, it shows that 95% of the sample firms are profit-
making firms and 94% of them were audited by BIG4 audit firms. The result is consistent 
with the selected sample firms, which are top 100 firms. These firms normally earned 
profit and they were clients of big audit firms’. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the frequency of selected ratios communicated by the firms in their 
annual reports.  Based on the table, the net assets per share ratio is among the popular 
ratios presented in the annual reports, where 73% of the sample firms provided this ratio. 
This ratio can be classified as share market measure ratio. This ratio provides indicator 
about the firm’s value per share. In order the attract investor or potential investors’ 
attention, providing this ratios could be helpful. 
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The next most commonly presented financial ratio is return on equity (ROE) where 33 
firms reported this ratio. This is a profitability ratio, where investors can have clues about 
how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. 
Providing this ratio to investors also potentially would enhance the understanding of 
investors about firms’ performance. Further, return on assets (ROA) was communicated by 
19 companies. This ratio provides an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to 
its total assets. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient the management is at using its assets 
to generate earnings. Similarly, this ratio indicates the profitability of the firms. 
 
Another category of ratios reported by the sample firms is gearing. 16% of the firms 
provide this ratio in their annual report. Gearing is a measure of a company’s financial 
leverage and shows the extent to which its operations are funded by lenders versus 
shareholders. The appropriate level of gearing for a company depends on its sector, as well 
as the degree of leverage employed by its peers.  
 
The next two ratios communicated by the firms are dividend payout and dividend yield, 
where 14 and 10 firms respectively communicated these ratios. The payout ratio provides 
an idea of how well earnings support the dividend payments. A stable dividend payout 









Table 3: Frequency of individual ratio 
 N Percentage 
Net  assets per share (NAPS) 73 73% 
Return on equity (ROE) 33 33% 
Return on assets (ROA) 19 19% 
Gearing (GEA) 16 16% 
Dividend payout (DP) 14 14% 
Dividend yield (DY) 10 10% 
Return on shareholder (RS) 7 7% 
Price to earnings ratio (PE) 6 6% 
Gross profit margin (GPM) 5 5% 







Table 4: Spearman Correlations 
 
 EFRD BODIND FSIZE OS PLF BIG4 
EFRD 1 .265
**
 .169 -.196 -.037 -.017 
BODIND .265
**
 1 .130 -.218* .033 .104 
FSIZE .169 .130 1 -.063 -.130 .012 
OS -.196 -.218* -.063 1 -.093 -.093 
PLF -.037 .033 -.130 -.093 1 -.058 
BIG4 -.017 .104 .012 -.093 -.058 1 
EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures, BODIND= Board independence, OS= Ownership Score, 
FSIZE= Firm Size, PLF=Profit or Loss Firm, BIG4= Big For Audit Firms. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed),* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
With reference to Table 4 above, there is a correlation between EFRD with BODIND, and 
BODIND and OS. EFRD and BODIND is significant at 99% with the value of correlation 
is 0.265. It indicates that with more BODIND variable, higher EFRD is disclosed. While 
BODIND and OS is significant at 95% level with the value of -0.218. This means that 





MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS 
 
 
Table 5: Multiple Regressions 
 
Variables  Coefficients t-stat p-value 
     
EFRD     
Adjusted R
2
 0.074    
Observations 100    
F statistics 2.587    
Significance 0.031    
     
Predictor variables     
Intercept  -.019 -0.075 0.940 
BODIND (H1)  .328 2.912 0.006** 
OS (H2)  -.094 -0.784 0.435 
FSIZE (H3)  .022 1.100 0.274 
PLF  -.030 -0.486 0.628 
BIG4  -.058 -1.038 0.302 
EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures, BODIND= Board independence, OS= Ownership Score, 
FSIZE= Firm Size, PLF=Profit or Loss Firm, BIG4= Big For Audit Firms. 




Based on the analysis, Table 5 reveals that BODIND variable does have a positive 
relationship with EFRD with the coefficient of 0.328 (p value = 0.01). This explains that 
higher number of independent directors increase the extent of the financial ratio 
disclosures. It explains that the role of independent directors as proposed in the MCCG 
actually works and it helps to add value to the quality of financial reporting. Thus, this 
finding is also consistent with previous studies (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Barako et al., 2006). 
 
However, hypotheses two and three are not supported in this study. The top thirty 
shareholders seem to have power in influencing company’s policy, yet it is not the case for 
financial ratios disclosure. This is probably due to the nature of the unique and specific 
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focus of financial ratio disclosure, as compared to other company’s policy making. For 
hypothesis three that seeks association between EFRD and firm size, this is potentially due 
to the sample size of the firms. Top 100 companies are giants companies and there are no 






















CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In summary, annual reports and financial ratios do play a significant role in conveying the 
financial information to the users in making wise decision. Sometimes, users do not realize 
that the important details in the annual reports are sometimes hidden between the lines, and 
users are suggested to know how to read between the lines to get accurate information. 
This is where the communication of financial ratios in the annual report comes into the 
picture.  
 
Financial ratios are among financial statement analysis tool that are widely used in 
communicating financial performance of the firms. This study is conducted to investigate 
the initiative taken by companies in assisting the annual reports readers in understanding 
the financial performance of the firms. This initiative is considered as voluntary. Potential 
reason why companies provide this information is to portray in a simple way about their 
performance. This is helpful for unsophisticated readers of annual reports. Further, by 
communicating financial ratios freely in the annual reports, potentially it will avoid 
additional cost being imposed to the users in order to get information about the firm. The 
information also is more reliable since it is provided in the company’s official annual 
reports, as compared to third party financial information provider. It can be concluded that 
companies take voluntary initiatives in order to help investors and potential investor in 
understanding the firm’s financial condition before making any investment decision. This 





Interestingly, this study found that higher number of independent directors has increased 
the extent of the financial ratio disclosures. This indicates that the roles of independent 
directors as proposed in the MCCG is meaningful and add value to the quality of financial 
reporting in Malaysian companies. 
 
In terms of the limitation, this study only considers ten (10) elements in the extent of 
financial ratio disclosures. More elements such as done by previous studies must be tested 
as the sample of country is different. Moreover, this study only consider one year (2011) as 
the period of study. In the future study, possibly a trend analysis may give more 
meaningful results. For corporate governance indicator, it can be increased to include more 
aspects such as duality leadership, board size and also the board quality in relation to 
extent of financial reporting quality. Also consideration can be look on the category of 
companies such as Government-Linked Companies and Family Companies as these 
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Prime Minister of Malaysia has launched the Economic Transformation Programme 
(ETP) on 25 October 2010 with aims to transform Malaysia into a high-income 
nation by 2020. The high-income is defines as a per capita income of USD15,000 or 
RM48,000, based on the World Bank’s definition of high income. In addition, this 
programme is also targeting Malaysia to become an advanced, developed nation with 
an economy possessing the characteristics that are common to developed nations. 
Together with this aim, ETP also aims to achieve the high income target inclusively 
for all Malaysian to share the benefits, and it must be sustainable in both economics 
and environmental terms (ETP, 2010). 
 
To achieve developed nation status by 2020, economic growth of 6 percent a year 
will be required. Ensuring Malaysia to enjoy this level of growth, a comprehensive 
and structured economic transformation is needed. Among the reasons why Malaysia 
need new approach is a slowing down of GDP growth about 4.3 percent (2001-2009) 
as compared to 9.2 percent (1991-1997). Further, there is also a risk for Malaysia to 
be stuck in the middle-income trap if no systematic programme to transform the 
underlying economies taken place. Strategies used to transform Malaysia from poor 
country to middle income country are no longer appropriate to bring Malaysia as 
higher-income nation. In addition, the global economy is more competitive for 
markets, capital and talent. Malaysia needs to work harder to achieve and sustain the 
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competitive advantage, in order to overcome low level of foreign-direct investment 
into Malaysia (ETP, 2010) 
 
Thus, ETP is introduced to transform Malaysian economy and it is a part of 
comprehensive government agenda. There are several key common foundations for 
the ETP including 1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now; Government 
Transformation Programme; and Tenth Malaysia Plan. The ETP focuses on key 
growth engines or National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs). It also is a private 
sector-led and government facilitated initiatives with 131 entry point projects to jump 
start the programme, focusing on value for money projects and initiatives, with the 
establishment of PEMANDU and guided by foundational measures (SRIs) (ETP, 
2010). 
 
NKEA is defined as a driver of economic activity that has the potential to directly 
and materially contribute a quantifiable amount of economic growth to the Malaysia 
economy. There are 12 NKEAs that are the Oil, Gas and Energy; Palm Oil; Financial 
Services; Tourism; Business Services; Electronics and Electrical; Wholesale and 
Retail’ Education; Healthcare; Communications Contents and Infrastructure; 
Agriculture; and Greater Kuala Lumpur/ Klang Valley. Of the 12 NKEAs, 11 are 
industry sectors and one which is Greater Kuala Lumpur/ Klang Valley is a 
geographical sector. The 11 sectors are expected to deliver 74 percent of the Gross 
National Income (GNI) growth potential over the next decade. Overall, these NKEA 
sectors are sectors in which Malaysia has current or potential competitive advantage, 
representing a mix of service, manufacturing, agriculture and extractive industries. 
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These sectors are spread across urban and rural areas and are likely to support growth 
in the rest of economy (ETP, 2010).  
 
Malaysia will focus its economic growth efforts on NKEAs, which will receive 
prioritized Government support including funding, top talent and Prime Ministerial 
attention. In addition, policy reforms will be targeted at the NKEAs. As shown by 
other countries such as Taiwan, Republic of Korea and Singapore, the specialization 
on certain sectors may transform Malaysia from middle income to high-income 
country. 
 
One of the critical NKEAs is the financial services. There are several challenges 
ahead in this sector as stated in Chapter 7 of the ETP including the low levels of 
financial literacy. It is suggested that the level of personal financial literacy today is 
low overall. With growing consumerism as well as changing customer expectations, 
there is a need to reinforce greater financial literacy to help the Rakyat to better 
manage their personal finances in line with our move to a high-income economy. 
Proper consumer education is needed if growth engines, such as private pensions, 
wealth management and asset management, with their more complex and 
sophisticated products, are to take off (ETP, 2010). 
 
The level of financial literacy can varies from various perspectives. For example, it 
can be different from sophisticated and non-sophisticated users of financial 
information, public people such as school children, teenagers, universities and 
colleges’ students and adults. The financial information is not only useful for users 
that directly utilize such information such as investors, but also for a large group of 
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public people. Nowadays, financial products become more sophisticated and 
complex, thus consumers in general need sufficient level of financial literacy to help 
them in making informed and conscious financial choices. 
 
Many developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Singapore have 
already implemented national strategies on financial literacy. As for Malaysia, 
various organizations such as Bank Negara, Securities Commission (SC), the 
Securities Industry Development Corporation (SIDC), and Bursa Malaysia have 
launched various initiatives to educate their customers to become more financial 
literate. For example, SIDC has various financial literacy programmes as early as kid 
at schools, teenagers, students at university campuses, and Malaysian investors as a 
whole. However, these efforts need to be more focused and better coordinated to 
increase their effectiveness and reach. This is because Malaysian may not yet 
sufficiently financially savvy as we have the highest level of household debt to GDP 
in Asia (about 77%), lack of sufficient knowledge and skills to prepare for retirement 
and making uninformed investment decision (ETP, 2010). 
 
MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
In responding to financial illiterate problem facing by financial information users, 
this research is undertaken to examine the initiatives provided by the Malaysian 
companies in assisting financial users to understand companies’ financial position. 
Undeniable, there are wide range and level of financial literacy perspectives. For 
example, from SIDC perspective, financial literacy can start from a simple view of 
money management for kids from primary school, including saving money, smart 
spending habits and how to plan finances at an early age. It also can be knowledge of 
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budgeting and savings, the different between needs and wants and also basic 
knowledge on investment for secondary school students. At the university level, 
financial literacy can be a knowledge related to financial planning and investing. The 
focus is on how university students should manage their money once they earn the 
money in the future.  
 
Further, another category group of people that could be relevant to the financial 
literacy is investors. To educate Malaysian investors, SIDC is established so they are 
protected from fraudulent transactions and able to make choices as informed market 
participants. SIDC educates and alerts the investors on various issues, such as 
investors’ protections, rights and responsibilities. One of the issues raised by SIDC is 
obligation of companies to disclose information in the annual reports. It is advised 
that investors should understand what is important in the annual report. As there are 
various information provided in the annual reports, investors should be sufficiently 
financially literate to pick up important information to enable them to make informed 
decision making.  
 
By law, directors and accountants of the firm should disclosed information that 
affects the decision making of the investing public. The directors must give a true 
and fair view of the company’s affair and they must not omit or misstate important 
information. It takes experience, knowledge and skills for investors to digest and 
choose relevant information for them.  
 
In addition to the information provided in the annual reports, investors also can get 
information from research analysts of stock broking companies and fund 
6 
 
management companies. However, extra careful should be exercised when digesting 
information from these parties because they have their own way to analyze and recast 
accounting information before produce their own report, as compared to what is 
provided by the companies in the official annual reports. Sometimes, information 
provided by these two sources is conflicting and confusing. 
 
SIDC also reminds investors that it is not easy to read annual reports. Judgments 
should be made based on facts, and not on publicity or propaganda. The important 
details in the annual reports are sometimes hidden between the lines, and investors 
are suggested to know how to read between the lines to get accurate information. 
 
This is where the communication of financial ratios in the annual report comes into 
the picture. Financial ratios are among financial statement analysis tool that are 
widely used in communicating financial performance of the firms. For the purpose of 
this study, a financial ratio is defined as a mathematical relation between two 
quantities (Subramanyam and Wild, 2009). The communication of financial ratios is 
measured as pre-defined ratios provided or reported by companies in their annual 
reports. Thus, this study is focusing on initiatives made by companies in 
communicating voluntary, yet important information in their annual reports, in order 
to assists their investor in understanding the financial conditions of the firms. 
 
Financial ratio disclosures are critically important for several reasons.  First, the 
disclosures could serve as the crucial information for users of financial statements, 
including sophisticated or non sophisticated users. Sophisticated users are reliant on 
disclosed financial ratios to assess the performance of companies.  Therefore, 
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providing a comprehensive set of financial ratios and how each was defined are 
crucial sources of information.  For non-sophisticated users, the financial ratio 
disclosures will enable them to make an informed investment decision making.  In 
addition, many ratios computed today are not standard. The lacks of uniformity 
limits the comparability in financial statements analysis and encourage companies to 
disclose the most favourable ratios to their firm’s condition (Gibson and Boyer, 
1980). Gibson (1982, p18) viewed that “probably no tool is more effective in 
evaluating the financial future of a company than the proper use of financial ratios”. 
Thus, the financial ratio disclosures are essential to overcome these problems.  
 
Despite their wide use and stated importance, there typically is a paucity of financial 
ratio information disclosed in company’s annual reports.  In recent years, there has 
been increasing interest in financial ratio disclosures.  Gibson (1982) provides a list 
and description of ratios that are frequently used in annual reports.  Watson, Shrives 
and Marston (2002) investigate the relationship between financial ratio disclosures 
and firm characteristics in U.K, while Australian companies were studied by Mitchell 
(2006) on their selectivity of reporting.  In Malaysia, Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2008) 
investigated the association between accounting ratios and performance of the firms. 
They found low level of disclosure. Ho, Aripin and Tower (2012) analyzed the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on financial 
ratios disclosure over the turbulent 2001 and 2006 periods in Malaysia. They found 
the highest category of financial ratio disclosures are profitability. None of corporate 
governance mechanisms are significantly influenced such disclosure. To date there 
has been little agreement on what should be disclosed due to the voluntary nature of 
financial ratio disclosures (with the notable exception of EPS).  This highlights the 
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requirement to understand how and why financial ratio information disclosures are 
made by firm management and the board of directors. 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study embarks on the following objectives: 
1. To examine the extent of financial ratio information communicated in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies. 
2. To examine the significant predictors influencing the extent of financial ratio 
communicated in the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are examined: 
1. What is the extent of disclosures of financial ratio information in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies? 
2. What are the significant predictors influencing the extent of financial ratio 
disclosures in the annual reports of Malaysia listed companies? 
 
SUMMARY 
This report is organised as follows. Chapter One provides an overview of the 
research including its background, motivation of the study, research questions and 
objectives.  Chapter Two reviews the previous literature and hypotheses to be tested 
are developed in this chapter using agency theory.  The research methodology is 
discussed in Chapter Three. It explains how every variable is measured and collected 
as well as what statistical techniques are utilized. Finally, Chapter Four presents the 
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findings and discussions. Chapter Five highlights the conclusion of the study; discuss 







This chapter provides insights on the literature of management disclosure incentive using 
the agency theory. Further, the discussion on the advantages of disclosure within the 
annual report is offered. Then, hypotheses development is discussed. 
 
AGENCY THEORY 
This research employs agency theory to assist in determining suitable factors that could 
influence voluntary financial ratio disclosures patterns. Agency theory is concerned with 
the relationship between the principal (owner) and agent (manager) of the firm. The 
underlying basis of agency theory is that one party (the principal) assigns work to another 
(the agent) who performs that work. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308), 
agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal/s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”.  
 
They also explain that agency theory enhances understanding of the situation where 
separate ownership and control between owner and top management of the firm occurs. 
They also suggest that these parties have their own concerns and preferences giving rise to 
what is known as a ‘conflict of interest’. A conflict of interest arises from divergent goals 





According to Fama and Jensen (1983), a considerably high cost is needed to monitor the 
actions and decisions made by an agent. This is because full monitoring of an agent’s 
actions seems unlikely in any principal-agent contract especially for large firms in 
developed industrial societies (Scott, 1997). The agency costs may include a component of 
expenditures incurred by the principal to monitor the agent, the agent’s cost on bonding, 
and the residual loss. In addition, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest the resolution to 
agency problems may require formal contracts, monitoring of management by the board of 
directors, information intermediaries and the market for corporate control.  
 
ADVANTAGES OF DICLOSURE WITHIN THE ANNUAL REPORT 
This section provides insights into the benefits of increased disclosure quantity. It is based 
on the argument that firms should provide sufficient decision-useful information to their 
stakeholders. Knauss (1964, p.607) posits that “disclosure, however, is not a simple 
method of regulation having universal application and universal effectiveness. It assumes a 
different role and meaning depending on the information to be disclosed, and the parties 
for whom the information is intended”.  
 
Botosan (2006) suggests public disclosure mitigates information asymmetry by displacing 
private information and concludes that greater disclosure reduces cost of equity capital.  
Further, Lundholm and Winkle (2006) develop and utilise the same theoretical framework 
in summarising the existing empirical work in the voluntary disclosure area. 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that disclosure reduces information asymmetry and 
cost of capital. Thus, more disclosure benefits both the firm and its stakeholders. In a 
related study, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) study the relationship between share 
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performance and extent of voluntary disclosure. They report that increased disclosure is 
associated with increases in stock performance, growth in institutional ownership, 
increased stock liquidity and higher analyst coverage.  
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that by disclosing more future information, it reduces 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, improves accuracy of users expectation and it also 
could attract the attention of analysts.  In addition, provision of forward looking 
information reduces the cost of capital. Thus, it implies that more disclosure of future-
orientated information reduces uncertainty of users.  
 
Evans and Sridhar (2002) investigate how disclosure may influence capital markets, 
product markets and shareholder litigation. They argue that favourable disclosure lead to a 
lower cost of capital. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) list five factors that motivate 
firms to voluntary disclose information. These are information asymmetry, increased 
analyst coverage, corporate control test, stock compensation and management talent. On 
the other hand, they suggest constraints on voluntary disclosure which are litigation risk, 
proprietary costs, political costs and agency cost, and limitation of mandatory disclosure 
precedent that may be hard to maintain.  
 
To conclude, previous studies have reported ample evidence on the positive impact of 
disclosure to the firms and shareholders. Several studies have applied agency theory in 
explaining the choice of disclosure policy by the firms. It is suggested that voluntary 
disclosure, in addition to mandatory disclosure, reduces the information asymmetry 
problem and therefore enhances better informed decision making. This notion applies to 
voluntary financial ratio disclosures. Despite its obvious benefits and functions, the 
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amount of research on voluntary disclosure of financial ratios is still low. Therefore, this 
study explores factors that encourage firms to voluntarily disclosed financial ratios in their 
annual reports. 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section provides the theoretical background utilized as a backbone for this research. 
Then, the hypotheses are developed based on past literature. A considerable amount of 
literature has been published on this voluntary financial reporting (Barako, 2004; Eng, 
Hong and Ho, 2001; Botosan, 1997; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; Hossain, Tan and 
Adams, 1994; Cooke, 1989; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 
1982). Meek et al. (1995, p. 555) defines voluntary disclosure as “disclosure in excess of 
requirements – represent free choices on the part of company managements to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their 
annual reports”. This section reviews previous studies that examine the association 




Corporate governance factors have the potential to minimize agency problems between 
managers and shareholders.  There are internal and external governance mechanisms 
designed to reduce agency costs.  These mechanisms are essential to moderate the self-
serving activities of managers.  Adoption of governance attributes as recommended by the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance  (MCCG)  constitute as one of the mechanism 
that helps reduce agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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In this study, the strength of corporate governance is measured as the proportion of 
independent directors on the board.  As proposed by Bathala and Rao (1995), composition 
of the board is one of several mechanisms than can mitigate agency conflicts within the 
firm, as outlined by agency literature.  The argument of agency theory is that independent 
directors are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions of executive directors 
due to their opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and also to ensure that 
managers are working in the best interest of the principal (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990).    
 
Palmieri (1979) states that independent directors are critically important because their 
extensive knowledge, experience and they are independent from management, and 
therefore serve an important role to minimise agency problems.  As highlighted by John 
and Senbet (1998), board composition is an important element to determine the 
effectiveness of the board.  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that an independent board 
serves as an important check and balance mechanism in enhancing boards’ effectiveness. 
Support for these assertions is further provided by Fama and Jensen (1983),  Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1995) and Eng and Mak (2003) . 
 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that boards with a larger proportion of independent 
directors are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure in Singapore.  This study also indicates that firms with boards that have a 
majority of independent directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms 
with boards that do not have a majority of independent directors.  In addition, Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) examined the association between independent directors and corporate 
disclosure.  They found a positive relationship between a board with a higher proportion of 
15 
 
independent directors and comprehensive financial disclosure.  These findings are 
consistent with agency theory where higher proportion of independent directors enhances 
voluntary financial reporting (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006). 
 
Further, the effect of good governance practices on the quality of financial reporting has 
recently received attention from researchers (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides, 
2000; Beasley 1996).  Beasley (1996) found that no-fraud firms have boards that have a 
significantly higher percentage of outside members than fraud firms.   These studies 
demonstrate that the inclusion of outside members on the board reduces the occurrence of 
financial statement fraud, and therefore assists in the provision of reported information that 
faithfully represents the value of financial statement elements. Goodwin and Seow (2002) 
argue that sound governance by board of directors influence the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
Computed financial ratios are an effective tool to evaluate firms’ operational results 
(Mitchell, 2006) and deemed to be the mirror of firms’ performance where higher financial 
ratios generally identify profitable firms (Horrigan, 1965).  Misuse of entities’ financial 
resources could be highlighted by financial ratios.  Thus, the transparency of corporate 
governance elements could minimize poor performance or mitigates fraudulent activity.  
This ultimately will influence the financial ratio disclosure policy, where firms with 
effective governance structure are expected to disclose more financial ratios as publicly 
available information. 
 
Consistent with this rationale, it is expected that the extent of financial ratio information 
disclosed will be positively related to the strength of corporate governance attributes of the 
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firm.  The reason for this is that the presence of independent directors makes the release of 
voluntary information less costly because insiders have less to hide (Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007). This leads to a hypothesis that underlines the link between a firm’s governance 
structure and their disclosure of financial ratio information.  The requirement to disclose 
corporate governance attributes will facilitate a comparison between a firm’s corporate 
governance characteristics and financial ratio disclosures.  To formally test the influence of 
corporate governance on financial ratio disclosures, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 




Ownership structure is another mechanism that aligns the interest of shareholders and 
managers (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Hossain 
et al., 1994).  It is believed that agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) will be 
higher in the widely held companies because of the diverse interests between contracting 
parties (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). By utilizing voluntary disclosure, managers 
provide more information to signal that they work in the best interests of shareholders.   
 
Using agency theory tenets, it is argued that firms with higher concentration of ownership 
structure may disclose less information to shareholders through discretionary disclosure.  
In Australia, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) note highly diversified companies disclose 
more voluntary information.  In this case, a sample of 65 listed diversified companies was 
studied on their voluntary disclosure of segment information.  Hossain et al. (1994) 
reported a negative association between ownership structure concentration (measured by 
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top 10 shareholders) and the level of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed firms.  
Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) hypothesised that the companies with higher 
ownership concentration disclose less voluntary information.  They found that director 
ownership is significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Lakhal 
(2005) found that share ownership concentration is statistically and negatively associated 
to voluntary earnings disclosures.  Oliveira et al. (2006) also documented that firms with a 
lower shareholder concentration voluntarily disclose more information about intangibles in 
Portugal. 
 
However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosures.  Craswell and Taylor (1992) found no 
relationship between ownership structure and the voluntary disclosure of reserves.  In 
research of voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies, Barako (2004) also 
found no relationship. 
 
Previous literatures clearly evident that information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders can be mitigated by disclosure strategies (Healy and Palepu, 2001). For this 
particular research, it is expected that ownership structure may influence the voluntary 
disclosure of financial ratio.  Therefore, the next hypotheses to be tested are: 




Firm size is another factor that may potentially influence financial ratio disclosure 
practices.  A large and growing body of literature has investigated the impact of firm size 
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to the disclosure practices of firms (Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Buzby, 1975; Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  Most of these studies found 
that size does affect the level of financial reporting of companies. 
Further, Watson et al. (2002) investigate the voluntary disclosure of accounting ratios in 
UK.  Their result suggests that large companies are more likely to disclose ratios than 
small companies.  Barako et al. (2006) study the factors influencing voluntary corporate 
disclosure by Kenyan companies and found that size is one of the factors that encourage 
the firm to disclose more information.  In another voluntary environmental disclosure 
study by large UK companies, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) also note that the larger the 
firm, the more likely they will make voluntary disclosures of environmental issues.   
 
In addition, Singhvi and Desai (1971) outline several reasons for a positive relationship 
between size of company and quality of disclosure.  They argued that larger firms tend to 
provide a better quality of disclosure because the lower cost of accumulating detailed 
information.  The other reasons are managers of larger company are more likely to realise 
the possible benefits of better disclosure and small companies are more likely to feel that 
full disclosure of information could endanger their competitive position.  
 
It can be concluded that firm size does matter to the voluntary financial reporting practices 
of companies.  Thus, the impact of firm size is also expected to be in the same direction for 
financial ratio disclosures.  Hypotheses designed to test this assertion are formally stated 
as: 








SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCE 
The companies are selected from top 100 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for 2011. 
These high profile companies are selected because the aim of study is looking at the 
initiatives provided by companies in communicating financial information.  It is believed 
that these high profile companies are pro-active in assisting government to realise the 
national agenda, ETP.  The year 2011 is considered as a one-year period after 
government’s announcement of ETP. The annual reports were gathered and the data were 
hand collected. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND MEASUREMENT 
The dependent variable of the study is Extent Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD)  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) 
The Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) Index is the proxy to measure the 
extensiveness of financial ratios disclosure.  This variable captures the voluntary 
disclosure practice of financial ratios in the annual reports. A disclosure index comprising 
list of ratios commonly discussed by seminal authors is developed. Based on Ho, Aripin 
and Tower (2012), the list is narrowed down to 10 mostly referred and cited financial 





Table 1: List of ratio and definition 
 Financial ratio Definition 
1. Net  Assets per Share (NAPS) Measure firm’s value per share. 
2. Return on equity (ROE) Measure profit a company generates with the 
money shareholders have invested. 
3. Return on assets (ROA) Measure profit of a company relative to its total 
assets 
4. Gearing (GEA) Measure the extent to which company’s operations 
are funded by lenders versus shareholders 
5. Dividend payout (DP) Measure how well earnings support the dividend 
payments 
6. Dividend yield (DY) Measure how much a company pays out in 
dividends each year relative to its share price 
7. Return on shareholder (RS) Measure a  return of a stock to an investor 
8. Price to earnings ratio (PE)  
 
Measure company's current share price compared 
to its per-share earnings. 
9. Gross profit margin (GPM Measure the proportion of money left over from 
revenues after accounting for the cost of goods 
sold. 
10. Debt to equity (DE) 
 
Measure the proportion of equity and debt the 
company is using to finance its assets. 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) is excluded since it is the sole financial ratio required to be 
disclosed by the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB).  Each voluntary ratio 
will be noted as being disclosed (1) if presented in the annual report for each company and 
(0) otherwise.  The EFRD score will then be computed by summing up all items disclosed 
divided by 10.  The EFRD score can be mathematically represented as follows: 
 
EFRDj =  total number of financial ratios disclosed 
                                 10 
Where:  






INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MEASURE 
To examine the extent of financial ratio disclosures in the annual report, the following 
independent variables will be tested: corporate governance, ownership concentration and 
firm size. 
 
Board independence (BODIND) 
Board independence is defined as the proportion of independent directors on the board.  
The Code on Corporate Governance Malaysia states a company should have a majority of 
independent directors on their board.  Therefore, BODIND is a measure of the percentage 
of independent directors to total number of directors on the board of directors.  The 
BODIND, measured as a percentage, and treated as a continuous variable.  
 
Ownership Score (OS) 
To create a proxy measure for Ownership Score (OS), total shareholding of top 30 
shareholders are used. OS is treated as a continuous variable by dividing number of shares 
owned by top thirty shareholders by the total number of shares issued.  
 
Firm Size (FSIZE) 
Firm size measurement is extensively studied in the past research.  It has been 
demonstrated that firm size is positively associated with disclosure levels (Barako, 2004; 
Watson et al., 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Singhvi 
and Desai, 1971).  There are variations on how firm size is determined.  For example 
Barako (2004) and Watson et al. (2002)  used total assets to measure firm size.  In 
contrast,  Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) used market value of equity and the book value 
of debt. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) used log of total assets and log of number of 
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shareholders to measure firm size.  For this research, firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  As suggested by Hossain et al. (1994), natural logarithmic 
transformation is used to reduce skewness in the data set. 
 
Control Variables Measure 
In order to control for other effects on the dependent variables, two (2) control variables 
are suggested.  These are (1) Profit/ Loss Firm (PLF) and (2) type of auditor.  PLF is 
measured as a categorical, where a score of (1) is assigned to profit firm, and (0) to loss 
firm. Similarly, a score of (1) is assign for Big4 audit firm; and otherwise (0). These 
variables are selected because it shed some lights on this issue in the previous studies. 
 
Data Analysis 
The data was run using SPSS software. Descriptive, univariate and regressions analysis 















RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. On 
average, the sample firms disclose 18.4% of the selected financial ratios in their annual 
reports. This Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) percentage is considered 
moderate as compare to previous studies by Ho, Aripin and Tower (2012). One possible 
reason is because the number of selected financial ratios in this study was reduced to 10, as 
compared to 43 financial ratios in the previous research. There were companies which not 
provided the selected financial ratios at all. However, the maximum percentage of the 
disclosure is 60% of the selected financial ratios. 
 
For the board independence (BODIND), almost half of the members of the board of 
directors are independent. This is in line with Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
recommendation where majority of the directors sit on the boardroom should be 
independence. The maximum proportion of independent directors on the board is 75%, 
which is beyond the recommendation by MCCG. 
 
Further, the ownership score (OS) is measured as the percentage of shareholding of top 30 
shareholders. As reported in Table 2, the minimum percentage of top 30 shareholders is 
26%, while the maximum percentage is 96%, with average percentage of shareholding of 




 Firm size (FSIZE) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets of the sample firms. 
The transformation is done to ensure the distribution of the data is normal. On average, the 
FSIZE is 9.51, with minimum and maximum score of 7.3 and 11.47 respectively. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 




100 23% 75% 45.37% 11.97% 
Ownership 
Score (OS) (%) 
100 26% 96% 80.63% 11.16% 
Firm Size 
(FSIZE)  
100 7.30 11.47 9.51 0.67 
Profit loss Firm 
(PLF) 
100 0 1 95% 21.9% 
Big4 (BIG4) 100 0 1 94% 23.9% 
 
 
Profit or loss firm (PLF) and type of auditor (BIG4) are measured using categorical 
dummy measure. From the analysis, it shows that 95% of the sample firms are profit-
making firms and 94% of them were audited by BIG4 audit firms. The result is consistent 
with the selected sample firms, which are top 100 firms. These firms normally earned 
profit and they were clients of big audit firms’. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the frequency of selected ratios communicated by the firms in their 
annual reports.  Based on the table, the net assets per share ratio is among the popular 
ratios presented in the annual reports, where 73% of the sample firms provided this ratio. 
This ratio can be classified as share market measure ratio. This ratio provides indicator 
about the firm’s value per share. In order the attract investor or potential investors’ 
attention, providing this ratios could be helpful. 
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The next most commonly presented financial ratio is return on equity (ROE) where 33 
firms reported this ratio. This is a profitability ratio, where investors can have clues about 
how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. 
Providing this ratio to investors also potentially would enhance the understanding of 
investors about firms’ performance. Further, return on assets (ROA) was communicated by 
19 companies. This ratio provides an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to 
its total assets. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient the management is at using its assets 
to generate earnings. Similarly, this ratio indicates the profitability of the firms. 
 
Another category of ratios reported by the sample firms is gearing. 16% of the firms 
provide this ratio in their annual report. Gearing is a measure of a company’s financial 
leverage and shows the extent to which its operations are funded by lenders versus 
shareholders. The appropriate level of gearing for a company depends on its sector, as well 
as the degree of leverage employed by its peers.  
 
The next two ratios communicated by the firms are dividend payout and dividend yield, 
where 14 and 10 firms respectively communicated these ratios. The payout ratio provides 
an idea of how well earnings support the dividend payments. A stable dividend payout 









Table 3: Frequency of individual ratio 
 N Percentage 
Net  assets per share (NAPS) 73 73% 
Return on equity (ROE) 33 33% 
Return on assets (ROA) 19 19% 
Gearing (GEA) 16 16% 
Dividend payout (DP) 14 14% 
Dividend yield (DY) 10 10% 
Return on shareholder (RS) 7 7% 
Price to earnings ratio (PE) 6 6% 
Gross profit margin (GPM) 5 5% 







Table 4: Spearman Correlations 
 
 EFRD BODIND FSIZE OS PLF BIG4 
EFRD 1 .265
**
 .169 -.196 -.037 -.017 
BODIND .265
**
 1 .130 -.218* .033 .104 
FSIZE .169 .130 1 -.063 -.130 .012 
OS -.196 -.218* -.063 1 -.093 -.093 
PLF -.037 .033 -.130 -.093 1 -.058 
BIG4 -.017 .104 .012 -.093 -.058 1 
EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures, BODIND= Board independence, OS= Ownership Score, 
FSIZE= Firm Size, PLF=Profit or Loss Firm, BIG4= Big For Audit Firms. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed),* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
With reference to Table 4 above, there is a correlation between EFRD with BODIND, and 
BODIND and OS. EFRD and BODIND is significant at 99% with the value of correlation 
is 0.265. It indicates that with more BODIND variable, higher EFRD is disclosed. While 
BODIND and OS is significant at 95% level with the value of -0.218. This means that 





MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS 
 
 
Table 5: Multiple Regressions 
 
Variables  Coefficients t-stat p-value 
     
EFRD     
Adjusted R
2
 0.074    
Observations 100    
F statistics 2.587    
Significance 0.031    
     
Predictor variables     
Intercept  -.019 -0.075 0.940 
BODIND (H1)  .328 2.912 0.006** 
OS (H2)  -.094 -0.784 0.435 
FSIZE (H3)  .022 1.100 0.274 
PLF  -.030 -0.486 0.628 
BIG4  -.058 -1.038 0.302 
EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures, BODIND= Board independence, OS= Ownership Score, 
FSIZE= Firm Size, PLF=Profit or Loss Firm, BIG4= Big For Audit Firms. 




Based on the analysis, Table 5 reveals that BODIND variable does have a positive 
relationship with EFRD with the coefficient of 0.328 (p value = 0.01). This explains that 
higher number of independent directors increase the extent of the financial ratio 
disclosures. It explains that the role of independent directors as proposed in the MCCG 
actually works and it helps to add value to the quality of financial reporting. Thus, this 
finding is also consistent with previous studies (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Barako et al., 2006). 
 
However, hypotheses two and three are not supported in this study. The top thirty 
shareholders seem to have power in influencing company’s policy, yet it is not the case for 
financial ratios disclosure. This is probably due to the nature of the unique and specific 
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focus of financial ratio disclosure, as compared to other company’s policy making. For 
hypothesis three that seeks association between EFRD and firm size, this is potentially due 
to the sample size of the firms. Top 100 companies are giants companies and there are no 






















CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In summary, annual reports and financial ratios do play a significant role in conveying the 
financial information to the users in making wise decision. Sometimes, users do not realize 
that the important details in the annual reports are sometimes hidden between the lines, and 
users are suggested to know how to read between the lines to get accurate information. 
This is where the communication of financial ratios in the annual report comes into the 
picture.  
 
Financial ratios are among financial statement analysis tool that are widely used in 
communicating financial performance of the firms. This study is conducted to investigate 
the initiative taken by companies in assisting the annual reports readers in understanding 
the financial performance of the firms. This initiative is considered as voluntary. Potential 
reason why companies provide this information is to portray in a simple way about their 
performance. This is helpful for unsophisticated readers of annual reports. Further, by 
communicating financial ratios freely in the annual reports, potentially it will avoid 
additional cost being imposed to the users in order to get information about the firm. The 
information also is more reliable since it is provided in the company’s official annual 
reports, as compared to third party financial information provider. It can be concluded that 
companies take voluntary initiatives in order to help investors and potential investor in 
understanding the firm’s financial condition before making any investment decision. This 





Interestingly, this study found that higher number of independent directors has increased 
the extent of the financial ratio disclosures. This indicates that the roles of independent 
directors as proposed in the MCCG is meaningful and add value to the quality of financial 
reporting in Malaysian companies. 
 
In terms of the limitation, this study only considers ten (10) elements in the extent of 
financial ratio disclosures. More elements such as done by previous studies must be tested 
as the sample of country is different. Moreover, this study only consider one year (2011) as 
the period of study. In the future study, possibly a trend analysis may give more 
meaningful results. For corporate governance indicator, it can be increased to include more 
aspects such as duality leadership, board size and also the board quality in relation to 
extent of financial reporting quality. Also consideration can be look on the category of 
companies such as Government-Linked Companies and Family Companies as these 
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